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ABSTRACT
The stochastic process-based models are developed to characterize the generation
and growth of metal-loss corrosion defects on oil and gas steel pipelines. The generation
of corrosion defects over time is characterized by the non-homogenous Poisson process,
and the growth of depths of individual defects is modeled by the non-homogenous
gamma process (NHGP). The defect generation and growth models are formulated in a
hierarchical Bayesian framework, whereby the parameters of the models are evaluated
from the in-line inspection (ILI) data through the Bayesian updating by accounting for
the probability of detection (POD) and measurement errors associated with the ILI data.
The Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation in conjunction with the data
augmentation (DA) technique is employed to carry out the Bayesian updating.
Numerical examples that involve both the simulated and actual ILI data are used to
validate the proposed Bayesian formulation and illustrate the application of the
methodology.
A simple Monte Carlo simulation-based methodology is further developed to
evaluate the time-dependent system reliability of corroding pipelines in terms of three
distinctive failure modes, namely small leak, large leak and rupture, by incorporating the
corrosion models evaluated from the Bayesian updating methodology. An example that
involves three sets of ILI data for a pipe joint in a natural gas pipeline located in Alberta
is used to illustrate the proposed methodology. The results of the reliability analysis
indicate that ignoring generation of new defects in the reliability analysis leads to
underestimations of the probabilities of small leak, large leak and rupture.

The

generation of new defects has the largest impact on the probability of small leak.

Keywords
Pipeline; Metal-loss corrosion; Stochastic process; Hierarchical Bayesian; Measurement
error; Probability of detection; Missing data; Markov chain Monte Carlo; Data
augmentation; System reliability
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Pipelines are widely recognized as the safest and most effective means to transport
large quantities of hydrocarbons over long distances. According to the Canadian Energy
Pipeline Association, there are approximately 115,000 km of natural gas and liquids
transmission pipelines in Canada; Canada exported approximately $83.5 billion worth of
crude oil and natural gas in 2012, most of which was transported by pipelines, and the
Canadian pipeline operators spent about $1.1 billion in 2012 to monitor and maintain the
vast pipeline network across Canada.
Metal-loss corrosion is a common threat to the structural integrity of steel pipelines.
Figure 1.1 shows typical external metal-loss corrosions on buried steel pipelines. The
periodical inspection of pipelines using high-resolution in-line inspection (ILI) tools is
widely employed in the pipeline industry and a key component of the pipeline corrosion
management practice. Figure 1.2 shows an ILI tool that has just completed the inspection
of a pipeline and is being retrieved at the receiving end. The data obtained from an ILI
on a given pipeline include the locations and sizes of corrosion features (i.e. defects) on
the pipeline, which provide a snapshot of the condition of corrosion, whereas the data
obtained from multiple ILI carried out at different times on the same pipeline allow one
to infer the progress of the corrosion condition over time. The main focus of the study
reported in this thesis is to develop methodologies to make inference of the state and
progress of corrosion on a given pipeline based on multiple sets of ILI data.
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Figure 1.1 Typical external metal-loss corrosions on buried steel pipelines

Figure 1.2 An ILI tool being retrieved from the pipeline after the inspection
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The corrosion process, which involves the generation of new defects and growth of
existing defects over time, is by nature highly uncertain, and the ILI data are imperfect
due to the limited detectability and measurement errors associated with the ILI tools. In
light of this, the Bayesian methodology was selected as the main vehicle to achieve the
objective of the study. The Bayesian methodology has been widely used to carry out the
condition assessment of aging structures and infrastructures (e.g. Zheng and Ellingwood
1998; Enright and Frangopol 1999; Kuniewski et al. 2009; Zhang and Zhou 2013). It
provides an ideal framework to combine existing knowledge and/or experience about the
condition of a structure with the new information contained in the inspection data to
develop the updated knowledge of the condition of the structure. The methodology can
also deal with uncertainties from different sources in a straightforward manner. A brief
description of the Bayesian methodology as well as the computational techniques involved
in the methodology is presented in the next section.

1.2 Bayesian Methodology
1.2.1 Overview
The essential characteristic of the Bayesian methodology is its explicit use of
probability for quantifying uncertainties in inferences based on statistical data analysis
(Gelman et al. 2004). The application of the Bayesian methodology can be divided into
the following three steps:
1. Set a full probability model, namely a joint probability distribution for all
observable and unobservable quantities in a scientific problem.
2. Calculate and interpret the joint posterior distribution based on the observed data.
3. Evaluate the fit of the model and implications of the resulting posterior distribution.
1.2.2 Bayesian inference
Based on Bayes’ rule, the joint posterior distribution of a vector of parameters, θ, in a
scientific model conditional on the observed data, y, can be written as follows:
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(1.1)
where p(|y) is the joint posterior distribution of ; p(y|θ) is the likelihood function of the
observed data y and p(θ) is the prior distribution of the model parameters θ. p(y) is an
integral of the product p(y|θ)p(θ) over all values of θ and can be regarded as a
normalizing constant to ensure that p(θ|y) is a proper density. This means that Eq. (1.1)
can be further expressed as
(1.2)
where “” represents proportionality.
The usual Bayesian structure given in Eq. (1.2) can be extended to a hierarchical
model if multiple parameters from a hierarchy of multiple levels are involved. For
example, a two-level hierarchical Bayesian model is given by
(1.3)
where

are the prior parameters of θ;

is the likelihood function of the first-level

model parameters θ conditional on the second-level model parameters
prior distribution of the model parameters

, and

is the

.

1.2.3 Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation
Because of the computational difficulties involved in the evaluation of the joint
posterior distribution in the Bayesian updating, the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
simulation techniques are commonly used to numerically evaluate the joint posterior
distribution. In the MCMC simulation, random samples of the parameters θ are drawn
sequentially, with the probability distribution of the current sampled draws depending on
the values of the samples drawn in the previous step. This forms a Markov chain. After
an initial sequence of iterations (i.e. the so-called burn-in period (Gelman et al. 2004)),
the random samples drawn from the subsequent iterations converge to the target
distribution, which is the joint posterior distribution. If the number of sequences is large
enough, the samples drawn after the burn-in period can then be used to evaluate the
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probabilistic characteristics (e.g. mean and standard deviation) of the posterior
distribution. Many MCMC sampling algorithms have been reported in the literature, e.g.
the celebrated Metropolis-Hasting (M-H) algorithm (Gelman et al. 2004), Gibbs sampler
(Gelman et al. 2004) and slice sampling approach (Neal 2003). A comprehensive review
of the MCMC algorithms can be found in Liang et al. (2010).

1.3 Objective and Research Significance
The study reported in this thesis is part of a Collaborative Research and Development
(CRD) program funded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council
(NSERC) of Canada and TransCanada Pipelines Limited. The objectives of this study
were to 1) develop a Bayesian framework to make statistical inferences of the metal-loss
corrosion process, which includes the growth of existing defects and generation of new
defects over time, based on imperfect data collected from multiple ILIs, and 2) develop
methodologies to evaluate the time-dependent system reliability of corroding pipelines by
incorporating the corrosion models obtained through the Bayesian updating methodology.
The proposed Bayesian framework provides a rational and consistent approach to
make quantitative inferences of the corrosion process on pipelines while taking into
consideration the inherent uncertainties associated with the corrosion process and
uncertainties associated with the inspection data.

The research outcome will assist

pipeline integrity engineers in developing defensible maintenance strategies for corroding
pipelines subjected to the safety and resource constraints. The probabilistic corrosion
models and Bayesian framework developed in this study can also be extended to other
aging structures and infrastructures subjected to localized deterioration.

1.4 Scope of the Study
This study consists of two main topics that are presented in Chapters 2 and 3,
respectively. Chapter 2 presents the stochastic process-based models to characterize the
generation and growth of individual corrosion defects on steel pipelines. The generation
and growth models are formulated and statistically inferred from the inspection data in a
hierarchical Bayesian framework by taking into account the uncertainties in the
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inspection data.

The MCMC simulation techniques in conjunction with the data

augmentation (DA) are employed to evaluate the model parameters. The developed
models and the proposed Bayesian methodology are illustrated and validated by both the
simulated and real inspection data. Chapter 3 presents a simulation-based methodology
to evaluate the time-dependent system reliability of corroding pipelines by
simultaneously considering the generation and growth of corrosion defects.

This

methodology provides a tool to incorporate the defect generation and growth models
obtained from the Bayesian updating to evaluate the system reliability of corroding
pipelines.

1.5 Thesis Format
This thesis is prepared in an Integrated-Article Format as specified by the School of
Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies at Western University, London, Ontario, Canada. A
total of four chapters are included in the thesis. Chapter 1 presents a brief introduction of
the background, objective and scope of this study. Chapters 2 and 3 form the main body
of the thesis, each of which is presented in an integrated-article format without an
abstract, but with its own references. The summary, conclusions and recommendations
for future research are given in Chapter 4.
Several simulation algorithms and Bayesian formulations developed and derived in
this study are given in appendices, which follow the last chapter. Each appendix is given
an identification that consists of a number and a letter. The number indicates the chapter
that the appendix is associated with, and the letter indicates the sequence of the appendix
appearing in that chapter. For example, Appendix 2A is the first appendix associated
with Chapter 2.

References
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concrete bridges using Bayesian updating. Journal of Structural Engineering, 125(10),
1118-1125.
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Chapter 2 Probabilistic Modeling and Bayesian Inference of
Generation and Growth of Corrosion Defects on Pipelines
Based on Imperfect Inspection Data
2.1 Introduction
Metal-loss corrosion involves two processes, namely the growth of existing defects
and the generation of new defects.

Both processes involve significant inherent

uncertainties. A rational probabilistic approach to characterize these two processes can
facilitate various tasks (e.g. reliability evaluation and determination of optimal
maintenance strategies) involved in the corrosion management of oil and gas pipelines.
The stochastic processes, e.g. the gamma process (e.g. Maes et al. 2009a; Maes et al.
2009b) and Markov chain (e.g. Timashev et al. 2008; Caleyo et al. 2009), have been
employed in the context of modeling the growth of corrosion defects. Recently, the
gamma process-based corrosion growth models in conjunction with the hierarchical
Bayesian methodology have been developed based on the inspection data obtained from
multiple in-line inspections (ILIs) (Zhang and Zhou 2013; Zhang et al. 2014). The
gamma process has non-negative and independent gamma-distributed increments over
disjoint (non-overlapping) time increments, and is suitable to characterize the monotonic
corrosion growth process and account for the temporal variability of the corrosion growth.
However, the above-mentioned studies only considered the growth of existing defects but
ignored the generation of new defects. Such a simplification may adversely impact the
accuracy of the integrity assessment and maintenance decision-making of corroding
pipelines.
A corrosion defect can initiate randomly in space and time. The Poisson processes,
including the homogeneous and non-homogenous Poisson process (HPP and NHPP),
have been widely used to model the defect generation (e.g. Hong 1999; Valor et al. 2007).
Hong (1999) employed HPP to characterize the generation of new defects and considered
the impact of newly generated defects on the evaluation of the failure probability of
corroding pipelines. Valor et al. (2007) employed NHPP to model the generation of
corrosion pits, and the Markov chain to model the pit growth. Note that the above studies
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did not address the evaluation of parameters of the HPP and NHPP models based on the
corrosion inspection data, which involve uncertainties as a result of the imperfect
detectability of the inspection tool.
The periodic inspections of pipelines provide valuable information pertaining to the
condition of the corrosion on pipelines. The ILI data include the sizes of individual
defects measured by the ILI tool as well as the number of defects detected by the ILI tool
at the time of inspection. The former is subjected to the sizing uncertainty (i.e. the
measurement errors) (Kariyawasam and Peterson 2008), whereas the latter is subjected to
the detecting uncertainty as reflected in the probability of detection and probability of
false call. It is of high practical value to make statistical inferences of the generation and
growth of corrosion defects simultaneously based on the inspection data, while taking
into account both the sizing and detecting uncertainties. Such studies are however scarce
in the literature. Kuniewski et al. (2009) developed a sampling-inspection strategy for
the reliability evaluation of corroding structures and proposed a Bayesian methodology to
update the NHPP-based defect generation model based on the sampling inspection data.
The probability of detection was considered in the updating, but the measurement errors
were ignored. Although the gamma process-based growth of corrosion defects was
considered in the reliability analysis, the parameters of the growth model were assumed
to be known; therefore, the updating of the growth model based on the inspection data
was not addressed in their study.
The objective of the work reported in this chapter is to develop a probabilistic model
to characterize the growth of existing defects and generation of new defects based on the
imperfect inspection data. The growth modeling was focused on the defect depth (i.e. in
the through-pipe wall thickness direction), as this is the most critical defect dimension.
The model was formulated in a Bayesian framework, which accounts for the inherent
variability involved in the corrosion process as well as the sizing and detecting
uncertainties associated with the ILI tool. To this end, the non-homogeneous gamma
process was used to model the growth of defect depths, and the non-homogenous Poisson
process was employed to model the generation of new defects. The Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation techniques in conjunction with the data augmentation
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algorithm for dealing with the missing data were used to carry out the Bayesian updating
to evaluate the probabilistic characteristics of the model parameters. Numerical examples
involving both hypothetical and real inspection data were used to illustrate the proposed
model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the uncertainties
involved in the ILI data; Section 2.3 presents the probabilistic models for the defect
generation and growth adopted in this study; the Bayesian methodology for evaluating
the defect generation and growth models based on the inspection data is described in
Section 2.4, and illustrated using numerical examples in Section 2.5, and conclusions are
presented in Section 2.6.

2.2 Uncertainties in the ILI Tool
Two categories of uncertainties associated with the ILI tool were considered in this
study, namely the measurement error and imperfect detectability. The former includes
the biases and random scattering error, whereas the latter is characterized by the
probability of detection (POD) and probability of false call (POFC).
2.2.1 Measurement error
The measured depth of the jth defect at the ith inspection, yij, (i = 1, 2, …, j = 1, 2, …)
can be related to the corresponding actual depth, xij, through the following equation
(Fuller 1987; Jaech 1985):
(2.1)
where ai and bi denote the constant and non-constant biases, respectively, associated with
the ILI tool used in the ith inspection, and εij denotes the random scattering error
associated with the ILI-reported depth of the jth defect at the ith inspection, and is assumed
to be normally distributed with a zero mean and standard deviation σi. It is further
assumed that for a given inspection i, εij and εik (j ≠ k) (i.e. the random scattering errors
associated with the ILI-reported depths of the jth and kth defects) are independent, whereas
for a given defect j, εij and εlj (i ≠ l) may be correlated with a correlation coefficient of ρil
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(Al-Amin et al. 2012). Let Ej = (E1j, E2j … Enj)′ denote the vector of random scattering
errors associated with n inspections for defect j, with “′” representing transposition. It
follows from the above assumption that Ej is multivariate normal-distributed and has a
probability density function (PDF) given by
(2.2)

where

denotes the n × n variance-covariance matrix of Ej with the element at the ith

row and lth column equal to ρilσiσl. In this study, ai, bi and

were assumed to be known

quantities whose values can be evaluated by comparing the ILI-reported and
corresponding field-measured depths for a set of benchmark defects (Al-Amin et al. 2012)
or inferred from the vendor-supplied specifications for the accuracy of the ILI tools.
2.2.2 Probability of detection and probability of false call
POD represents the ability of an ILI tool to detect a true corrosion defect. It is
typically a function of the size of the defect and a set of parameters indicating the
inherent detecting capability of the ILI tool. The following exponential POD function
(Zheng and Ellingwood 1998) was adopted in this study:
(2.3)
where x denotes the actual depth of a given defect; xth denotes the detection threshold, i.e.
the smallest defect size that can be detected, and q is a constant that characterizes the
inherent detecting capability of the ILI tool. Figure 2.1 shows the POD curves given by
Eq. (2.3) with three sets of values of q (1/%wt) and xth (%wt), where %wt represents the
percentage of the pipe wall thickness (wt). This figure indicates that the detectability of
the tool increases as the value of q increases and/or the detection threshold xth decreases.
The probability of false call (POFC) is the probability of an ILI tool obtaining an
indication of a defect that does not exist in reality. For the high-resolution ILI tools
commonly used to inspect oil and gas pipelines, POFC is typically negligibly small.
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Therefore, POFC was ignored in the present study; in other words, all the ILI-reported
corrosion defects were assumed to be true corrosion defects.
1
0.9
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0.8
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Figure 2.1 POD curves with different sets of values of q and xth

2.3 Probabilistic Models for Defect Generation and Growth
2.3.1 Defect generation
The non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) was employed to characterize the
generation of new defects, as the model has been widely used in the literature (e.g. Valor
et al. 2007; Kuniewski et al. 2009). According to this model, the total number of defects,
N(t), generated within a time interval [0, t] (e.g. t = 0 denotes the time of installation of
the pipeline) over a given segment of the pipeline follows a Poisson distribution with a
probability mass function (PMF), fP(N(t)|m(t)), defined as (Beichelt and Fatti 2002)
(t ≥ 0)

(2.4)
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where m(t) denotes the expected number of defects generated over the time interval [0, t],
and is assumed in this study to follow a power-law function of time (Kuniewski et al.
with the parameters  and  (,  > 0) to be

2009):

quantified based on the inspection data. Figure 2.2 depicts the means, 2.5- and 97.5percentile values, and realizations of N(t) over 20 years based on Eq. (2.4) corresponding
to two sets of assumed values of λ and δ. Note that N(t) degenerates to a homogeneous
Poisson process (HPP) if  equals unity.
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80

λ = 3; δ = 0.8
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16
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Figure 2.2 Mean, 2.5-percentile, 97.5-percentile and a given realization of NHPP
Suppose n inspections have been carried out for a given pipeline segment over a
certain period of time. It is assumed that each inspection is able to identify new and
existing corrosion defects by tracking their spatial positions.

This assumption is

consistent with the corrosion inspection practice for oil and gas pipelines (Al-Amin et al.
2012). At the time of the ith inspection (i = 1, 2, ..., n), ti, the total number of corrosion
defects on the pipeline segment, Ni, can be divided into those defects that have initiated
prior to the (i-1)th inspection, Nio, and those defects that initiated between the (i-1)th and
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ith inspections, Nig. The quantity Nig then follows a Poisson distribution with a PMF
given by

(2.5)
, and t0  0.

where

Because of the imperfect detectability of the ILI tool, the detected number of defects is
in general less than the actual number of defects. Let Nigd and Nigu denote the detected
and undetected portions of Nig, respectively, i.e. Nig = Nigd + Nigu. Based on the Poisson
splitting property (Kulkarni 1995), Nigd and Nigu follow Poisson distributions with the
corresponding PMFs as follows:

where

=

(2.6)

=

(2.7)

is the average POD with respect to the Nig defects.

as

, where

can be calculated

is the PDF of the depths of

defects at

time ti.
2.3.2 Defect growth
The non-homogeneous gamma process (NHGP) (Zhang et al. 2014) was employed to
characterize the growth of depths of corrosion defects. It follows that the depth of a
given defect at time t, X(t), is gamma distributed with the PDF given by:
(2.8)
where α(t) is the time-dependent shape parameter and assumed to be a power-law
function of time, i.e. α(t) =

(t > ts), with ts denoting the defect initiation time
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(the time at which a defect initiates and starts growing); β (β > 0) is the time-independent
rate parameter (or inverse of the scale parameter) (Ang and Tang 2007); Γ(∙) denotes the
gamma function, and I(0,∞)(x(t)) is the indication function, which equals unity if x(t) > 0
and zero otherwise. The mean, variance and coefficient of variation (COV) of X(t) equal
α(t)/β, α(t)/β2 and 1/(α(t))0.5, respectively. The quantity φ1/β represents the mean of the
depth at the first unit increment of time since ts; φ2 reflects the slope of the mean growth
path of the defect with φ2 > 1, φ2 < 1 and φ2 = 1 representing an accelerating, a
decelerating and a linear mean growth path, respectively.

Furthermore, φ2 = 1

corresponds to a homogeneous gamma process.
In this study, the parameters φ1 and φ2 were assumed to be common for all the defects,
whereas ts and β were assumed to be defect-specific to account for the spatial variability
of the defect growth. Let tsr and βr denote the time of initiation and rate parameter for the
rth defect (r = 1, 2, ...), respectively. It should be emphasized here that the index r is used
to enumerate all defects, including detected and undetected defects, to distinguish from
the index j that is used to enumerate detected defects. The parameter βr was further
assumed to be an exponential function of the random effect parameter ξr, i.e. βr =

.

The advantage of expressing βr as an exponential function is that it ensures βr to be
positive and can easily incorporate local covariates, if any, to more accurately
characterize βr.
It follows from the above-described assumptions that the depth increment of defect r
over the time interval between the (i-1)th and ith inspections, denoted by Δxir, is gammadistributed with a shape parameter Δαir and a rate parameter βr, where Δαir is given by

(2.9)

The depth of defect r at the ith inspection, xir, is then the summation of the depth at the
(i-1)th inspection and Δxir; that is, xir = xi-1, r + Δxir. Note that xir at t = tsr is assumed to
equal zero.
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2.4 Bayesian Updating of Defect Generation and Growth Models
2.4.1 Overview
The Bayesian updating was employed to make statistical inferences of the parameters
of the defect generation and growth models described in Section 2.3 based on the ILI data.
Through Bayes' theorem, the Bayesian updating combines the previous knowledge about
uncertain model parameters with the new information contained in the observed data to
lead to updated knowledge about these parameters. The previous knowledge is reflected
in the prior distributions; the new information in the observed data is incorporated in the
likelihood functions, and the updated knowledge of the parameters is reflected in the
posterior distributions. The formulations of the prior and posterior distributions as well
as the likelihood functions for the defect generation and growth models are described in
the following sections.
2.4.2 Likelihood functions
2.4.2.1 Likelihood function for ILI-reported depths
Consider that a set of defects have been detected in a total of n inspections. Suppose
that defect j is first detected in the lth (l = 1, 2, ..., or, n) inspection. Let yj = (ylj, yl+1,j, …,
yl+k,j, …, ynj)' denote the vector of the ILI-reported depths for defect j. Further let xj = (xlj,
xl+1,j, …, xl+k,j, …, xnj)' denote the vector of the actual depths of defect j corresponding to
the ILI-reported depths. Given the measurement error model described in Section 2.2.1,
the likelihood of yj conditional on xj can be expressed as
(2.10)

where a = (al, al+1, …, an)', and b is an n-l+1 × n-l+1 diagonal matrix with the kth element
equals to bl+k. The above formulation assumes that once a defect is detected for the first
time, it will be detected in all subsequent inspections. It should be noted that this
assumption can be relaxed in the analysis; that is, the defect is not necessarily detected in
all subsequent inspections. In this case, the ILI-reported depths corresponding to the
inspections that do not detect the defect can be considered as the missing data and
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handled using the multiple imputation technique (Rubin 2009), which has been
implemented in widely used Bayesian updating software such as OpenBUGS (Lunn et al.
2009).
2.4.2.2 Likelihood function for the number of detected defects
To simplify the likelihood functions for the number of defects, it is assumed that the
defects detected for the first time (referred to as the newly detected defects) in the ith
inspection are generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections. This assumption ignores
the possibility that some of the newly detected defects in the ith inspection may in fact
initiate prior to the (i-1)th inspection but remain undetected until the ith inspection. The
assumption results in overestimation of the intensity of the defect generation. It follows
from the assumption that the newly detected defects in the ith inspection can be denoted
by Nigd as defined in Section 2.3.1.

Based on this assumption and Eq. (2.6), the

likelihood function for the set of newly detected defects in n inspections, i.e. Nigd (i = 1,
2, …, n), is given by

(2.11)
Note that the evaluation of

involves the depths of both detected and undetected

defects in the ith inspection. The depths of undetected defects were treated as the missing
data and handled using the data augmentation (DA) technique (Tanner and Wong 1987),
which is described in Section 2.4.4. It follows that

serves as a link between the

defect generation and growth models in the Bayesian updating.
2.4.3 Prior distributions
The gamma distribution was selected as the prior distribution for parameters λ and δ of
the NHPP-based defect generation model, and for parameters φ1 and φ2 of the NHGPbased defect growth model, based on the consideration that the gamma distribution
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ensures these parameters to be positive and can be conveniently constructed to be noninformative.

Consistent with the assumption stated in Section 2.4.2.2, the prior

distribution for the initiation time of a given detected defect j, tsj, was selected to be
uniformly distributed with the corresponding upper bound (ubj) equal to the time of the
inspection that detects the defect for the first time and the lower bound (lbj) equal to the
time of the immediate previous inspection. The prior distributions for tsj for different
defects were further assumed to be mutually independent. The random effect parameter
ξr corresponding to different defects were assumed to follow independent identical (iid)
normal prior distributions with a mean of zero and a common uncertain variance σ2. The
hierarchical structure for ξr facilitates the generation of the depths of undetected defects
as required by the data augmentation analysis. Finally, the prior distribution for 1/σ2was
assigned a gamma distribution (i.e. σ2 follows an inverse-gamma distribution) as
commonly suggested in the literature (e.g. Ntzoufras 2011), which leads to the conjugate
posterior distribution for 1/σ2 and can improve the computational efficiency. The shape
(rate) parameters of the gamma prior distributions for φ1, φ2, ,  and 1/σ2 are denoted by
c (d), e (f), g (h),  (η) and (), respectively.
2.4.4 Posterior distributions, MCMC simulation and missing data
Because it is not possible to analytically derive the complex joint posterior distribution
of the parameters of the defect generation and growth models, the Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation techniques (Gilks 2005) were employed to numerically
evaluate the joint posterior distribution of the model parameters. A hybrid algorithm
combining the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm and Gibbs sampling (Tierney 1994)
was implemented in MatlabTM to carry out the MCMC simulation. The derivations of
full conditional posterior distributions of the model parameters as required by the hybrid
algorithm are included in Appendix 2A. It is emphasized that both the detected and
undetected defects were incorporated in the Bayesian updating. The actual depths of the
detected defects are related to the ILI-reported depths through the likelihood function
given by Eq. (2.10), whereas the actual depths of the undetected defects were treated as
the missing data and imputed using the DA technique (Tanner and Wong 1987).
Therefore, the joint posterior distribution of the model parameters was evaluated from the
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depths of the overall defect population as opposed to the depths of the detected defect
population only.
DA is an iterative process and can be straightforwardly incorporated in the MCMC
simulation. A given DA iteration includes two steps, namely the imputation step and the
posterior step (Little and Rubin 2002). The former is used to generate the samples of the
missing data from its corresponding probabilistic distribution conditional on the current
state of model parameters, and the latter is used to generate a new set of samples of
model parameters from their corresponding posterior distributions conditional on both the
observed and missing data. Details of the DA technique can be found in Little and Rubin
(2002).
A step-by-step procedure for generating samples of the model parameters as well as
samples of the missing data (i.e. depths of undetected defects) in the kth (k = 1, 2, ...)
MCMC simulation sequence is described as follows, where the notation (k) is used to
denote the value of  obtained in the kth simulation sequence.
1. Impute depths of undetected defects (i.e. missing data).
1.1) Generate the number of undetected defects initiated between the (i-1)th and ith (i
= 1, 2, …, n) inspections, i.e. Nigu(k), from the Poisson PMF given by Eq. (2.7) with ,

 and

replaced by (k-1), (k-1) and

1.2) Generate depths of Nigu(k) undetected defects,

, respectively.
, (v = 1, 2, ..., Nigu(k)) as follows.

1.2.1) Set v = 0;
1.2.2) generate a random effect parameter (k) from the normal distribution with a
zero mean and a variance of σ2(k-1), and then calculate (k) =

;

1.2.3) generate a defect initiation time ts(k) based on the procedure described in
Appendix 2B.
1.2.4) generate a defect depth x from the gamma PDF given by Eq. (2.8) with 1,
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2, ts and  equal to 1(k-1), 2(k-1), ts(k) and (k), respectively;
1.2.5) if x is less than the detection threshold of the ILI tool, i.e. xth, accept x as
the depth of an undetected defect; otherwise, accept x with a probability of 1 POD(x);
1.2.6) set v= v + 1 if x is accepted, and
1.2.7) repeat Steps 1.2.2) through 1.2.6) until v = Nigu(k).
2. For the set of Nigd defects (i = 1, 2, ..., n), i.e. the newly detected defects in the ith
inspection, generate the corresponding depths at the ith and all subsequent inspections,
(l = i, i + 1, ..., n; j = 1, 2, ..., Nigd) as follows:
2.1) generate the increments of the depth between consecutive inspections for each of
the Nigd defects,

, from the full conditional posterior distribution listed in

Appendix 2A using the M-H algorithm, and
for j = 1, 2, ..., Nigd.

2.2) calculate
3 Calculate

for i = 1, 2, ..., n as follows:

.
4 Sample (k), (k), 1(k), 2(k), tsj(k), j(k) (j = 1, 2, ...,

(2.12)

) and σ2(k) from the

corresponding full conditional posterior distributions listed in Appendix 2A using either
the M-H algorithm or Gibbs sampling.

2.5 Illustrative Examples
2.5.1 Example 1
In the first example, we used hypothetical (i.e. simulated) inspection data to illustrate
and validate the proposed Bayesian methodology. The parameters , , 1 and 2 of the
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defect generation and growth models were set to be deterministic quantities with  = 2, 
= 1.2, 1 = 3 and 2 = 0.9, and the random effect parameter  for different defects was
assumed to follow iid normal distributions with a zero mean and σ2 = 0.36. It is assumed
that three inspections were carried out after the installation of the pipeline (t = 0) with ti =
i × 5 years (i = 1, 2 and 3). For simplicity, the constant and non-constant biases included
in the measurement error model given by Eq. (2.1) were set to equal zero and unity,
respectively, for all the inspections, and the random scattering errors associated with
different inspections were assumed to be mutually independent with the same standard
deviation of unity. Finally, the POD functions associated with all the inspections were
assumed to be identical, with the parameters q and xth set to be q = 0.30 (1/%wt) and xth =
1 (%wt). Table 2.1 summarizes the simulated inspection data, whereby the simulation
procedure is described in Appendix 2C.

Note that the simulation is based on the

assumption stated in Section 2.4.2.2, i.e. the newly detected defects in the ith inspection
are all generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections.
Table 2.1 Summary of the simulated inspection data
Time of Inspection

Year 5

Year 10

Year 15

Number of Detected Defects

9

19 (10)

31 (12)

Mean

8.0

14.3 (6.5)

19.5 (8.8)

Standard deviation

3.9

9.7 (3.5)

12.8 (3.8)

Measured
Depth
(%wt)

Note: The information for newly detected defects in years 10 and 15 year is in brackets.
The Bayesian updating was carried out to evaluate the parameters of the defect
generation and growth models based on the simulated inspection data. The shape and
scale parameters of the gamma prior distributions for , , 1 and 2 were set to be unity,
and the shape and scale parameters of the inverse-gamma prior distribution for σ2 were
set to be 10. A total of 100,000 MCMC simulation sequences were generated following
the procedure described in Section 2.4.4, with the first 10,000 sequences considered as
the burn-in period (Gelman et al. 2004) and discarded. The samples in the rest of the
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sequences were used to evaluate the probabilistic characteristics of the model parameters.
The means, medians and standard deviations of the posterior marginal distributions of the
model parameters that are common to all the defects are summarized in Table 2.2, where
,

and

denote the average POD for the defects generated prior to year 5,

between years 5 and 10, and between years 10 and 15, respectively. The results in Table
2.2 suggest that the posterior mean and median values of , , 1 and 2 are in good
agreement with the corresponding actual values.
Table 2.2 Posterior statistics of model parameters for Example 1
Generation

Growth

(NHPP)

(NHGP)

Parameter

λ

δ

φ1

φ2

Mean

1.79

1.26

2.99

0.86

0.66

0.57

0.71

Median

1.79

1.25

2.91

0.91

0.66

0.57

0.71

0.31

0.08

0.35

0.09

0.08

0.06

0.06

Standard
Deviation

To investigate the impact of undetected defects on the outcome of the Bayesian
updating, two additional scenarios were considered.

Scenario I assumes perfect

detectability associated with all three inspections (i.e. no undetected defects), whereas
Scenario II considers POD but includes only the detected defects (i.e. ignoring the
missing data) in calculating

(i = 1, 2 and 3) and updating the growth model. In

contrast, the results summarized in Table 2.2 are referred to as the base case. The MCMC
simulation was carried out for Scenarios I and II. For the base case and Scenarios I and II,
the mean values of the number of generated defects, i.e. m(t) = tδ, were then calculated
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 20 years, where the values of  and δ were set to the corresponding posterior
medians. The results are shown in Fig. 2.3. For comparison, m(t) evaluated from the
actual values of  and δ, the simulated total numbers of defects (including the detected
and undetected defects) at the times of the three inspections, as well as the simulated
numbers of defects detected by the three inspections are also shown in Fig. 2.3. As
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indicated in the figure, m(t) corresponding to the base case is practically identical to the
actual mean and agree well with the total number of defects, whereas both Scenarios I
and II lead to underestimated m(t) values with the degree of underestimation increasing
with time. The values of m(t) corresponding to Scenario I at t = 5, 10 and 15 years agree
well with the inspection data. This is expected because perfect detectability is assumed
for Scenario I.

The m(t) curve corresponding to Scenario II lies in between those

corresponding to Scenario I and the base case.
accounted for in Scenario II,

This is because although POD is

is overestimated as a result of ignoring the missing

data in the calculation.
For the base case and Scenarios I and II, the depths of the detected defects at year 20
were predicted and compared with the corresponding actual defect depths. The predicted
depth for a given defect was selected as the mean depth predicted from the NHGP-based
growth model, with values of the model parameters (i.e. 1, 2, tsj and ξj) set to the
corresponding posterior medians. The results are shown in Fig. 2.4. Figure 2.4 suggests
that all three cases predict the growth of corrosion defects reasonably well: the predicted
depths for 90% of the 31 detected defects fall between the two bounding lines of actual
depth 10%wt. The differences between the predictions corresponding to the three cases
are marginal: the predictions for relatively shallow defects (say, depth ≤ 30%wt)
corresponding to Scenarios I and II tend to be slightly higher than those corresponding to
the base case.
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Figure 2.3 Comparison of predicted numbers of defects corresponding to the base case
and Scenarios I and II
As described in Section 2.4.2.2, the Bayesian methodology developed in this study
involves the simplifying assumption that the newly detected defects in the ith inspection
are all generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections. To investigate the impact of this
assumption on the predictive capability of the proposed methodology, we further
simulated more realistic corrosion data considering the possibility that some of the newly
detected defects in the ith inspection may in fact initiate prior to the (i-1)th inspection but
remain undetected until the ith inspection. These data were then used to update the
corrosion generation and growth models and make predictions.
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Figure 2.4 Comparison of the predicted and actual depths at year 20
The corrosion inspection data at years 5, 10 and 15 were simulated based on the same
set of parameters as those used to generate the data summarized in Table 2.1 except for
the POD curve. Three different POD curves were considered in this case, corresponding
to POD of 90%, 70% and 50%, respectively, for a defect depth of 5%wt with a detection
threshold of 1%wt. The simulated inspection data corresponding to the three different
POD curves are summarized in Table 2.3. The simulation procedure is described in
Appendix 2D.
The Bayesian updating was then carried out corresponding to the base case, Scenarios
I (i.e. perfect detectability) and II (i.e. ignoring the missing data in evaluating the average
POD). The mean values of the number of generated defects, i.e. m(t) = tδ, were
calculated for 0 ≤ t ≤ 20 years, where the values of  and δ were set to the corresponding
posterior medians. The results are shown in Figs. 2.5 in a similar fashion as those shown
in Fig. 2.3.
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Table 2.3 Summary of the simulated inspection data corresponding three different
POD curves
(a) POD = 90% for a defect depth of 5%wt

Time of Inspection

Year 5

Year 10

Year 15

Number of Detected Defects

12

26 (14)

48 (22)

Measured

Mean

5.9

12.4(9.2)

17.8 (10.0)

Standard deviation

4.2

8.2 (6.4)

11.7 (7.2)

Depth
(%wt)

(b) POD = 70% for a defect depth of 5%wt

Time of Inspection

Year 5

Year 10

Year 15

Number of Detected Defects

10

25 (15)

49 (24)

Measured

Mean

8.0

14.1 (10.4)

18.8 (12.5)

Standard deviation

4.9

9.0 (7.8)

12.0 (7.6)

Depth
(%wt)

(c) POD = 50% for a defect depth of 5%wt

Time of Inspection

Year 5

Year 10

Year 15

Number of Detected Defects

7

20 (13)

44 (24)

Mean

7.0

14.1(11.7)

18.3 (12.1)

Standard deviation

5.3

8.3 (6.4)

11.4 (6.8)

Measured
Depth
(%wt)
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(a) POD of 90% for a defect depth of 5%wt
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(b) POD of 70% for a defect depth of 5%wt
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(c) POD of 50% for a defect depth of 5%wt
Figure 2.5 Comparison of predicted numbers of defects corresponding to the base case
and Scenarios I and II based on more realistic corrosion inspection data
As indicated in Fig. 2.5, the m(t) curves corresponding to the base case overestimate
the total number of defects. The degree of overestimation decreases as the detectability
of the inspection tool increases. This is because the higher is the detectability of the
inspection tool, the smaller portion of the newly detected defects are previously
undetected defects and the smaller impact does the simplifying assumption have on the
prediction. It is interesting to note that the m(t) curves corresponding to Scenario II agree
with the total defect population better than those corresponding to the base case and
Scenario I. This is because ignoring the missing data in calculating the average POD in
Scenario II leads to overestimation of the average POD and underestimation of the total
number of defects, which somewhat offsets the overestimation of the total number of
defects due to the simplifying assumption that the newly detected defects in the ith
inspection are all generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections. It should be pointed
out that the POD assumptions corresponding to Figs. 2.5(a) and 2.5(b) are more
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representative of the inspection tools commonly used in the pipeline industry than that
corresponding to Fig. 2.5(c). For the former two assumptions, the conservatism in the
predictions associated with the base case is relatively small.
2.5.2 Example 2
In the second example, real ILI data collected from a pipe joint (approximately 13.6m
long) in a natural gas pipeline located in Alberta were used to illustrate the proposed
methodologies. The pipeline was constructed in 1972 and inspected by high-resolution
magnetic flux leakage (MFL) tools in 2004, 2007 and 2009. Note that the pipeline had
also been inspected prior to 2004; however, the corresponding inspection data are not
available to the present study. The numbers of defects on the pipe joint considered and
the statistics of the corresponding defect depths reported by the ILIs in 2004, 2007 and
2009 are summarized in Table 2.6.
The measurement errors associated with the three ILI tools as well as the correlation
between the random scattering errors associated with different ILI tools were quantified
using the Bayesian methodology in a previous study (Al-Amin et al. 2012).

The

calibrated biases, the random scattering errors as well as the correlations between the
random scattering errors are as follows: a1 = 2.04 (%wt) , a2 = -15.28 (%wt), a3 = -10.38
(%wt), b1 = 0.97, b2 =1.40, b3 = 1.13; 1 = 5.97 (%wt), 2 = 9.05 (%wt) and 3 = 7.62
(%wt); 12 = 0.70, 13 = 0.72 and 23 = 0.78 (Al-Amin et al. 2012), where the subscripts
‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ denote the parameters associated with the ILI tools used in 2004, 2007 and
2009, respectively. The above-mentioned measurement errors were quantified based on
128 defects that were located on several pipe joints in the same pipeline considered in
this example, but were mitigated and ceased growing prior to 2000.
The actual POD functions associated with the ILI tools are unavailable. We therefore
assumed the three ILI tools to have the identical exponential POF function given by Eq.
(2.3). The detection threshold xth in Eq. (2.3) was assumed to be 1 (%wt), whereas the
parameter q was characterized for both the high and relatively low detectability
assumptions. The former corresponds to a POD of 90% for a defect depth of 5%wt,
resulting in q = 0.58 (1/%wt), and the latter corresponds to a POD of 70% for the depth of
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5%wt, resulting in q = 0.30 (1/%wt). The two assumed POD curves are compared in Fig.
2.6.
Table 2.4 Summary of the ILI-reported defect information
Time of Inspection

2004

2007

2009

Number of detected defects

67

78 (11)

99 (21)

Measured

Mean

17

11 (7)

11 (8)

Depth (%wt)

Standard deviation

7.6

10.0 (1.2)

7.8 (1.2)

Note: The information for newly detected defects in 2007 and 2009 is in brackets.

1

0.9

High detectability

0.8

Relatively low detectability
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0.6
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Figure 2.6 Comparison of the two assumed POD curves
The shape and scale parameters of the gamma prior distributions for , , 1, 2 and
1/σ2 were set to be 10. For a given POD curve, a total of 100,000 MCMC simulation
sequences were generated with the first 10,000 sequences discarded. The samples in the
rest of the sequences were used to evaluate the posterior characteristics of the model
parameters.

The posterior means, medians and standard deviations of the model
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parameters corresponding to the high and low detectability assumptions are summarized
in Table 2.5, where

,

and

denote the calculated average PODs for the

defects initiated within the periods of 1972-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2009,
respectively.
The mean, 2.5- and 97.5-percentile values of the number of defects generated as a
function of time according to NHPP are shown in Fig. 2.7. The mean value was obtained
as m(t) = tδ, with  and δ equal to their corresponding posterior median values. The 2.5
and 97.5- percentile values of the number of defects were obtained by assuming that the
total number of defects at a given time approximately follows a normal distribution with
a mean of tδ and a standard deviation of

according to the central limit theorem.

For comparison, the numbers of defects reported by ILI tools in 2004, 2007 and 2009,
respectively, are also plotted in Fig. 2.7. Figure 2.7 indicates that the predicted mean
numbers of defects in 2004, 2007 and 2009 are greater than those reported by ILI tools.
This is expected because the number of defects predicted by the NHPP model includes
both the detected and undetected defects, whereas the ILI-reported defects are detected
defects only.

The mean numbers of defects corresponding to the relatively low

detectability assumption are higher than those corresponding to the high detectability
assumption. This also makes sense because the total number of defects increases as the
detectability of the tool decreases, if the number of detected defects remains the same.
Table 2.5 Posterior statistics of model parameters for Example 2

Parameter

Generation

Growth

(NHPP)

(NHGP)

λ
0.70

δ
1.41

φ1
3.62

φ2
0.58

σ2
0.21

0.98

0.76

0.76

L

0.69

1.44

3.65

0.57

0.21

0.93

0.60

0.58

H

0.67

1.41

3.60

0.58

0.20

0.98

0.77

0.76

L

0.66

1.44

3.62

0.56

0.21

0.93

0.60

0.58

Standard

H

0.24

0.10

0.53

0.05

0.03

0.01

0.10

0.08

Deviation

L

0.24

0.10

0.60

0.05

0.03

0.02

0.09

0.08

Mean
Median

H1
2

1. High detectability. 2. Relatively low detectability
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Figure 2.7 Predicted number of defects as a function of time corresponding to the high
and relatively low detectability assumptions
The mean, 2.5- and 97.5- percentile values of the predicted growth paths for five
selected detected defects, Defects #13, #26, #37, #61 and #64, are plotted in Figs. 2.8(a)
through 2.8(e), respectively. For a given defect, the mean, 2.5- and 97.5- percentile
values were evaluated based on the fact that the defect depth at a given time t (t ≥ tsj)
follows a gamma distribution with the shape parameter equal to 1(t – tsj)2 and the rate
parameter equal to eξj. The values of 1, 2, tsj and ξj were set to their corresponding
posterior medians. For comparison, the corresponding ILI-reported depths in 2004, 2007
and 2009 are also plotted in the same figures. The results indicate that the predicted
growth path differs from defect to defect, which is expected because of the defectspecific initiation time tsj and random effect parameter ξj.

The predicted depths

corresponding to the high detectability assumption are almost the same as those
corresponding to the relatively low detectability assumption, suggesting that the
detectability of the ILI tool has a negligible impact on the predicted growth paths of the
detected defects.
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Figure 2.8 Predicted growth paths of selected defects corresponding to the high and
relatively low detectability assumptions
The impact of POD and the undetected defects (i.e. missing data) on the outcome of
the Bayesian updating was further investigated. In addition to the base case presented in
Table 2.7, two additional scenarios, similar to the two scenarios considered for Example
1, were considered: Scenario I assumes perfect detectability for all three inspections,
whereas Scenario II accounts for POD but ignores the missing data in calculating

(i

= 1, 2 and 3) and updating of the growth model. The mean values of the predicted
number of defects, m(t), corresponding to the base case and Scenarios I and II are shown
in Fig. 2.9. Note that all the predictions shown in Fig. 2.9 are based on the POD curve
corresponding to the relatively low detectability assumption.

For comparison, the

numbers of defects reported by the three inspections are also shown in the same figure.
As indicated in Fig. 2.9, m(t) corresponding to the base case are greater than the
corresponding ILI-reported numbers of defects as explained in the previous section. On
the other hand, m(t) corresponding to Scenario I agree with the ILI-reported numbers of
defects better than the other two cases, and m(t) values corresponding to Scenario II are
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greater than the ILI data and those corresponding to Scenario I but less than those
corresponding to the base case.. The explanation for these observations is the same as
those for Fig. 2.3.
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Figure 2.9 Comparison of predicted numbers of defects corresponding to the base case
and Scenarios I and II for the relatively low detectability assumption
The mean growth paths for Defects #13, #26, #37, #61 and #64 predicted from the
base case and Scenarios I and II corresponding to the relatively low detectability
assumption are plotted in Figs. 2.10(a) through 2.10(e), respectively. The results indicate
that the predicted growth paths corresponding to Scenario I and II are in general slightly
higher than those corresponding to the base case. This is because the undetected defects
(i.e. missing data), which are typically shallow defects, were included in the Bayesian
updating of the parameters of the growth model in the base case. Ignoring the undetected
defects in the Bayesian updating leads to that the values of the defect-common
parameters (i.e. φ1 and φ2) tend to be higher than those of the same parameters by
considering the missing data; therefore, the predicted defect growth paths corresponding
to Scenario I and II tend to be somewhat higher than those corresponding to the base case
for the same defect.
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Figure 2.10 Comparison of the growth paths corresponding to the base case and
Scenario I and II for the relatively low detectability assumption

2.6 Summary and Conclusions
A stochastic process-based hierarchical Bayesian methodology was proposed to
characterize the generation and growth of metal-loss corrosion defects on oil and gas
pipelines. The defect generation was characterized by the non-homogenous Poisson
process, and the growth of the defect depth was modeled by the non-homogenous gamma
process with a time-dependent shape parameter and a time-independent scale parameter.
All the model parameters were treated as uncertain variables and evaluated from the
Bayesian updating based on the imperfect inspection data obtained from multiple ILI
runs. The imperfect detectability of the ILI tool as characterized by POD as well as the
measurement errors associated with the ILI data were accounted for in the Bayesian
updating. The Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation together with the data
augmentation (DA) algorithm to deal with the undetected defects (i.e. missing data) was
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employed to evaluate the posterior distributions of the parameters involved in the defect
generation and growth models.
The application of the proposed model was illustrated using the simulated inspection
data in Example 1 and real inspection data in Example 2. For both examples, three
different scenarios were considered, namely including the missing data in calculating the
average POD for each inspection, ignoring the missing data in calculating the average
POD and assuming perfect detectability for all the inspections (i.e. ignoring POD).
Based on the inspection data simulated in accordance with the simplifying assumption
involved in the proposed model, namely the newly detected defects in the ith inspection
are all generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections, the results of the Bayesian
updating indicate that the last two scenarios lead to underestimated overall defect
population, which is consistent with the model formulations and validates the proposed
model. Based on the more realistic simulated inspection data, the results of the Bayesian
updating indicate that the first scenario leads to overestimation of the overall defect
population because of the simplifying assumption involved in the proposed model.
However, the degree of overestimation is marginal as long as the detectability of the
inspection tool is high or relatively high, which is typically the case for high-resolution
inspection tools employed on oil and gas pipelines nowadays. The overestimation of the
defect population due to the simplifying assumption is somewhat compensated by the
overestimation of the average POD in the second scenario; as a result, the predicted
overall defect population agrees well with the actual population. The last scenario leads
to underestimated overall defect population. On the other hand, the growth paths of the
detected defects predicted by the three scenarios differ only slightly, with the predictions
corresponding to the latter two scenarios being slightly higher than those corresponding
to the first scenario for shallow defects.
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Chapter 3 Reliability Analysis of Corroding Pipelines
Considering the Generation and Growth of Corrosion Defects
3.1 Introduction
Metal-loss corrosion poses a significant threat to the structural integrity of oil and gas
pipelines. The corrosion process involves both the generation of new defects and growth
of existing defects over time. Both aspects should be taken into consideration in the
evaluation of the time-dependent reliability of corroding pipelines.
The majority of reliability evaluations of corroding pipelines reported in the literature
employed the random variable-based growth models for corrosion defects (e.g. Ahammed
1998; Caleyo et al. 2002; Amirat et al. 2006; Zhou 2010, 2011). Note that the random
variable-based growth model cannot capture the temporal variability involved in the
corrosion growth process (Pandey et al. 2009). This drawback of the random variablebased corrosion growth model can be overcome by the stochastic process-based growth
model (van Noortwijk and Frangopol 2004; Frangopol et al. 2004).

Hong (1999)

evaluated the system reliability of corroding pipelines in the context of developing the
optimal inspection and maintenance schedule subjected to the reliability constraint. The
Markov process was employed to characterize the growth of corrosion defects, and the
homogeneous Poisson process was used to model the generation of new defects.
Parametric analyses were carried out to illustrate the impact of the probability transition
matrix of the Markov process on the system reliability and optimal inspection schedule,
whereas the updating of the defect growth and generation models based on the inspection
data was not discussed in Hong's study. Recently, a homogenous gamma process-based
growth model was employed in the system reliability evaluation of corroding pipelines
(Zhang and Zhou 2013). A Bayesian approach was applied to evaluate the parameters
involved in the gamma process-based growth model using the inspection data obtained
from multiple in-line inspections (ILIs). The updated parameters were used to predict the
growth of depths (i.e. in the through-pipe wall thickness direction) of individual corrosion
defects. The predicted depths of the corrosion defects were then employed in the limit
state functions to evaluate the time-dependent system reliability of corroding pipelines.
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However, the generation of new defects was ignored in Zhang and Zhou's study; that is,
the number of corrosion defects in the pipeline was assumed to be fixed over time. It
follows that this assumption leads to overestimation of the system reliability of the
corroding pipeline.
This chapter presents a methodology to evaluate the time-dependent system reliability
of corroding pipelines by incorporating the Bayesian updating of the defect generation
and growth models based on the imperfect inspection data. The gamma process and nonhomogeneous Poisson process as presented in Chapter 2 were employed to characterize
the growth of existing defects and generation of new defects on the pipeline. The
parameters of the growth and generation models were evaluated through the Bayesian
updating based on the imperfect in-line inspection (ILI) data. The Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation techniques were employed to carry out the updating. The
updated defect growth and generation models were then incorporated in the simple Monte
Carlo simulation to carry out the system reliability analysis of corroding pipelines in
terms of three distinctive failure modes, namely small leak, large leak and rupture. A
numerical example is used to illustrate the proposed methodology.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the defect
generation and growth models; Section 3.3 presents the Monte Carlo simulation-based
methodology to evaluate the time-dependent system reliability of corroding pipelines by
considering the generation and growth of corrosion defects; the illustrative numerical
example is described in Section 3.4, and the conclusions are presented in Section 3.5.

3.2 Corrosion Generation and Growth Models
3.2.1 Defect generation and growth modeling
The non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) and non-homogenous gamma process
(NHGP) as described in Chapter 2 were employed to model the generation and growth of
corrosion defects, respectively. Let t (years) (t = 1, 2, ...) denote the time elapsed since
the installation of a given pipeline (t = 0 indicating the time of installation) and tsr denote
the initiation time of defect r (r = 1, 2, ...). Further let tn denote the time of the most
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recent inspection of the pipeline. Pipeline integrity engineers are typically interested in
evaluating the system reliability of the pipeline for a given forecasting period T (years)
(e.g. T = 5 or 10 years) starting from tn.
It follows from Eq. (2.5) in Chapter 2 that the increase in the number of defects from
years t -1 to t, denoted by ΔNt, follows a Poisson distribution with a probability density
function (PDF) given by
=

(3.1)

where m(t) denotes the expected number of defects generated over the time interval [0, t]
and is commonly expressed as

. The expression λv(t) is the so-called

intensity function, with λ and v(t) being the proportionality constant and shape function,
respectively. As described in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2, we assumed a power-law
intensity function: λv(t) = λδtδ-1. It follows that m(t) = λtδ. Both λ and δ were treated as
uncertain parameters and updated through the Bayesian inference based on the ILI data.
Substituting m(t) = λtδ into Eq. (3.1) results in
=

(3.2)

The total number of defects generated from the time of the most recent inspection (tn)
to year tn + τ (τ = 1, 2, ..., T), i.e. the τth year within the forecasting period, is given by
(3.3)
It follows from Eq. (2.8) in Chapter 2 that the growth of the depth of defect r (r = 1, 2,
...) from years t -1 to t, Δxtr, follows a gamma distribution with PDF given by

Γ

(3.4)

where Δαtr and βr are the shape and rate parameters of the corresponding gamma
distribution, respectively. As described in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2, Δαtr was assumed
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(t ≥ tsr +1) and βr equals to

to equal

, where ξr is

the random effect parameter.
The depth of defect r at year tn + τ (τ = 1, 2, ..., T), xr(tn + τ), i.e. the depth at the τth
year within the forecasting period, is given by
(3.5)
Note that

and

for t ≤ tsr.

3.2.2 Bayesian updating of the defect generation and growth models
The Bayesian updating was employed to make statistical inferences of the parameters
of the defect generation and growth models based on the imperfect ILI data, as described
in Section 3.2.1. Through the Bayesian updating, the previous knowledge about the
corrosion models and the new information contained in the ILI data can be combined to
update the knowledge about the defect generation and growth models. The previous
knowledge is reflected in the prior distributions of the model parameters; the new
information in the ILI data is incorporated in the likelihood functions, and the updated
knowledge of the model parameters is reflected in the posterior distributions.
The inspection data obtained from each ILI run consists of both the number of
detected defects and measured depths of detected defects. The probability of detection
(POD) and measurement error associated with the ILI tool were incorporated in the
Bayesian updating. More specifically, the likelihood function for the number of detected
defects incorporates the average POD of each ILI run, whereas the likelihood function for
the ILI-reported depths incorporates the measurement error.
Because of the computational difficulties involved in the evaluation of the joint
posterior distribution of the model parameters in the Bayesian updating, the Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation techniques were used to numerically evaluate the
joint posterior distribution. In this study, a hybrid algorithm combining the Metropolis–
Hastings (M-H) algorithm and Gibbs sampling was implemented in MatlabTM to carry out
the MCMC simulation. The data augmentation (DA) technique (Tanner and Wong 1987)
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was also incorporated in the MCMC simulation to deal with the undetected defects (i.e.
missing data). Detailed descriptions of the Bayesian updating including the selection of
the prior distribution, derivation of the full conditional posterior distributions required by
the MCMC simulation algorithm and a step-by-step procedure to combine the MCMC
simulation with DA are given in Chapter 2.

3.3 Time-dependent System Reliability Analysis
3.3.1 Limit state functions
A pressurized pipeline at a corrosion defect may fail by two distinctive failure
mechanisms, namely the small leak and burst (Zhou 2010). For natural gas pipelines (as
opposed to liquid pipelines), a burst can be further classified as a large leak or rupture
(Zhou 2010) depending on if the through-wall defect resulting from the burst extends
unstably along the longitudinal (axial) direction of the pipeline.
The limit state function for a given corrosion defect penetrating the pipe wall at time t,
g1(t), is
1

t

(t)

(3.6)

where wt denotes the wall thickness of the pipeline, and x(t) denotes the depth of the
corrosion defect at time t. The use of 0.8wt as opposed to wt in the above equation is
consistent with typical industry practice, as a remaining ligament thinner than 0.2wt is
considered prone to developing cracks that could lead to leaks (Al-Amin and Zhou 2014).
The limit state function for plastic collapse under the internal pressure at the defect at
time t, g2(t), is given by
2

t

(t)

(3.7)

where rb(t) denotes the burst pressure capacity of the pipe at the defect at time t, and p is
the internal pressure of the pipeline and assumed to be time-independent in this study.
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The limit state function for the unstable axial extension of the through-wall defect that
results from the burst, g3(t), is given by
3

t

(t)

(3.8)

where rrp(t) is the pressure capacity of the pipeline at the location of the through-wall
defect resulting from the burst at time t. A burst is classified as a rupture if g3(t) ≤ 0;
otherwise, it is defined as a large leak.
Given Eqs. (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), the cumulative probabilities of small leak, large leak
and rupture within a time interval (0, t], denoted by Psl(t), Pll(t) and Prp(t), respectively,
are defined as follows (Al-Amin and Zhou 2014)
Psl(t) = Prob[g1(t) ≤ 0 ∩ g2(t) > 0]

(3.9a)

Pll(t) = Prob[g1(t) > 0 ∩ g2(t) ≤ 0 ∩ g3(t) > 0]

(3.9b)

Prp(t) = Prob[g1(t) > 0 ∩ g2(t) ≤ 0 ∩ g3(t) ≤ 0]

(3.9c)

where Prob[•] denotes the probability of an event, and “∩” represents the intersection
(i.e. joint event). Note that the probability of a small leak occurring first then followed
by a burst was considered extremely small and therefore ignored in the analysis.
3.3.2 Burst and rupture pressure capacity models
In this study, we adopted the B31G modified criterion (Kiefner and Vieth 1989) to
evaluate the burst pressure of a pipeline containing a single corrosion defect. The burst
pressure capacity rb is given by

(3.10a)

(3.10b)
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where y is the yield strength of the pipe material;y + 68.95 (MPa) (i.e.y + 10 ksi) is
the flow stress; ζb is the model error; D is the outside diameter of the pipeline; L is the
defect length, i.e. in the longitudinal direction of the pipeline, and M is the Folias factor
or bulging factor.
The flow stress-dependent failure criterion for a through-wall flaw developed by
(Kiefner et al. 1973) was employed in this study to calculate rrp as follows:
(3.11)
where σf is the flow stress and equals y + 68.95 (MPa), and M is the Folias factor given
by Eq. (3.10b). Due to a lack of information in the literature, the model error associated
with Eq. (3.11) was ignored in the analysis.
3.3.3 Basic assumptions and analysis procedures
A pipeline containing multiple corrosion defects is a series system because failure at
any defect causes the failure of the pipeline. For simplicity, only the defect depth and the
number of defects were treated as time-dependent in this study, whereas all the other
uncertain parameters (e.g. the defect length and internal pressure) involved in the limit
state functions were assumed to be time-independent. Furthermore, the spatial variability
of the pipe geometry (i.e. diameter and wall thickness) and material property (i.e. yield
strength), internal pressure and model error associated with burst capacity model was
ignored; that is, these parameters at different defects were assumed to be fully correlated.
Finally, the defect lengths associated with different defects were assumed to be
independent.

It then follows that the probability of small leak is governed by the

maximum value of the depths of all the defects, and the probability of burst is governed
by the minimum value of the burst pressure capacities associated with all the defects.
The growth of the depth of individual defect was characterized by the NHGP and the
generation of new defects was modeled by the NHPP described in Section 3.2.1. The
posterior median values of the model parameters involved in the generation and growth
models were evaluated from the ILI data through the Bayesian updating described in
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Section 3.2.2, and further employed in a simple Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the
time-dependent system reliability of a corroding pipeline.
Consider that a total of Ne defects have been detected and sized by the inspection tools
on a given pipeline. A simple Monte Carlo simulation-based approach was developed to
evaluate the reliability of the pipeline after the most recent inspection considering the
growth of existing defects and generation of new defects.

The analysis procedure

involved in a given simulation trial is described as follows. Note that the depths of the
undetected defects generated prior to the most recent inspection are generally small
compared to the detected defects. Therefore, these undetected defects were ignored in
the reliability analysis because the system reliability is governed by the critical defects
with relatively large depths and/or high growth rates.
1. Generate samples for σy, wt and D, lengths of the jth existing defects Lj (j = 1, 2, ...,
Ne), the internal pressure p and the model error for the burst capacity model ζb from the
corresponding probabilistic distributions.
2 Start from the forecasting time τ = 1 (year)
2.1) Obtain the depth of the jth existing defect at year tn + τ, xj (tn + τ), based on Eq.
(3.5). In Eq. (3.5), Δxτj is generated from the gamma distribution given by Eq. (3.4) with
the values of φ1, φ2, tsj and ξj equal to the corresponding median values of their posterior
distributions updated from the ILI data through the Bayesian methodology.
2.2) Obtain the number of new defects generated from year tn to year tn + τ, N (tn +
τ), based on Eq. (3.3). In Eq. (3.3), ΔNτ is generated from the Poisson distribution given
by Eq. (3.2) with the values of λ and δ equal to their corresponding posterior median
values resulting from the Bayesian updating.
2.3) For simplicity and to be slightly conservative, set the initiation time tsk of the
kth (k = 1, 2, ..., ΔNτ) new defect generated within year tn + τ (τ = 1, 2, ..., T) equal to tn + τ
-1.
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2.4) Generate the random effect parameter, ξk, of the kth (r = 1, 2, ..., ΔNτ) new
defect generated within the year tn + τ (τ = 1, 2, ..., T) from the normal distribution fN (0,
σ2) with σ2 equal to the corresponding posterior median value obtained from the
Bayesian updating.
2.5) Generate the depth of the kth new defect (k = 1, 2, …, N (tn + τ)) at year tn + τ,
xk (tn + τ), based on Eq. (3.5). In Eq. (3.5), Δxτk is generated from the gamma distribution
given by Eq. (3.4) with the values of φ1 and φ2 equal to the corresponding posterior
median values, and the values of tsk and ξk were obtained from steps 2.3) and 2.4),
respectively.
2.6) Generate the lengths for all the newly generated defects from the corresponding
probabilistic distribution.
2.7) Calculate g1 = 0.8wt – max{x (tn + τ)}, where x (tn + τ) is the vector of depths of

all the existing and newly generated defects. Set the depth xi (tn + τ) (i = 1, 2, …, N (tn + τ)
+ Ne) to be 80%wt if xi (tn + τ) > 80%wt.
2.8) Substitute the values of wt, D, σy, L, ζb and x (tn + τ) into the B31G modified
model given by Eq. 3.10(a) to calculate the burst pressure capacities at different defects,
where L is the vector of lengths of all the existing and newly generated defects.
Calculate g2 = min{rb} – p, where rb denotes the vector of burst pressure capacities at the
considered defects.
2.9) If g1 > 0 and g2 > 0, set τ = τ + 1. Go to step 2.1) if τ ≤ T, and start a new
simulation trial otherwise.
2.10) If g1 ≤ 0 and g2 > 0, set sl(τ) = sl(τ) + 1, where sl(τ) is the counter for small
leak. Set τ = τ+1. Go to step 2.1) if τ ≤ T, and start a new simulation trial otherwise.
2.11) If g2 ≤ 0, calculate g3 = rrpm – p, where rrpm is the rupture pressure at the defect
that has the lowest burst pressure at year tn + τ. If g3 > 0, set ll(τ) = ll(τ) + 1, where ll(τ) is
the counter for large leak; if g3 ≤ 0, set rp(τ) = rp(τ) + 1, where rp(τ) is the counter for
rupture. Set τ = τ+1. Go to step 2.1) if τ ≤ T, and start a new simulation trial otherwise.
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By repeating steps 1 to 2 for the desired number of simulation trials, Nsim, the
probabilities of small leak, large leak and rupture up to year τ (τ = 1, 2, ..., T), can be
evaluated as follows:
(3.12a)

(3.12b)

(3.12c)

3.4 Example
3.4.1 General information
In this section, the same natural gas pipe joint described in Section 2.5.2 of Chapter 2
is used to illustrate the proposed system reliability evaluation methodology for corroding
pipelines. The pipe joint was made from API 5L X52 steel with a specified minimum
yield strength (SMYS) of 359 MPa and a specified minimum tensile strength (SMTS) of
455 MPa, and has an outside diameter of 508 mm, an operating pressure of 5.66 MPa and
a nominal wall thickness of 5.56 mm. The joint is 13.6 m long and has been inspected by
high-resolution ILI tools in 2004, 2007 and 2009. After the ILI in 2009, a total of 99
defects have been detected and sized by the inspection tools. A summary of the depths of
the detected defects is shown in Table 2.6 of Chapter 2.

The measurement errors

associated with the three ILIs employed in 2004, 2007 and 2009 are presented in Section
2.5.2. The probabilistic characteristics of the random variables involved in the reliability
analysis are listed in Table 3.1. Note that the lengths (L) of individual defects were
assumed to be independent and identically distributed with a mean of 50 mm and a
coefficient of variation (COV) of 15.6% (Zhou 2010).
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Table 3.1 Probabilistic characteristics of the basic random variables
Parameter

Unit

Distribution
type

Nominal value

Mean

COV
(%)

D

mm

Normal

508

508

0.06

wt

mm

Normal

5.56

5.56

4.5

L

mm

Normal

50

50

15.6

y

MPa

Normal

359

398

3.4

p

MPa

Gumbel

5.66

5.93

2.0

b

--

Gumbel

1.00

1.297

25.8

Source
CSA (2007)
Jiao et al.
(1995)
Zhou (2010)
Al-Amin and
Zhou (2014)
CSA (2007)
Zhou and
Huang (2012)

3.4.2 Results
The posterior median values of the parameters of the defect generation and growth
models have been evaluated from the Bayesian updating based on the three sets of ILI
data as described in Chapter 2. These values are summarized in Table 2.5 of Chapter 2
corresponding to the assumptions of the high and relatively low detectability of the ILI
tools.

They were then employed in the simple Monte Carlo simulation procedure

described in Section 3.3.3 to evaluate the time-dependent system reliability of the pipe
joint. For the purpose of illustration, we only employed the posterior median values of
the model parameters corresponding to the high detectability assumption (i.e. a POD of
90% for a defect depth of 5%wt with a detection threshold of 1%wt) to evaluate the
system reliability.
A total of 1,000,000 simulation trials were carried out to evaluate the probabilities of
small leak, large leak and rupture over an 11-year forecasting period since the most
recent inspection, i.e. from years 2010 to 2020. The probabilities of small leak, large leak
and rupture over the forecasting period considering the growth of existing defects as well
as the generation and growth of new defects were calculated, and the results are shown in
Fig. 3.1. Figure 3.1 indicates that the probability of small leak increases the fastest with
time compared with the probabilities of large leak and rupture. The probability of large
leak is the highest of those of the three failure modes.
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Figure 3.1 Cumulative probabilities of small leak, large leak and rupture
3.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
During the forecasting period, the depths of the existing defects increase with time. At
the same time, new defects initiate and start to grow once initiated. Both the existing and
new defects therefore impact the system reliability evaluated. In addition to the base case
scenario where both POD and the undetected defects (i.e. missing data) were considered
in the Bayesian updating of the model parameters, two additional scenarios were
considered to investigate the impact of POD and the undetected defects on the system
reliability. The two scenarios are the same as those considered in Section 2.5 of Chapter
2; that is, Scenario I assumes perfect detectability for all three inspections, whereas
Scenario II accounts for POD but ignores the missing data in calculating the average
POD in each inspection.

The posterior median values of the model parameters

corresponding to the base case, Scenario I and II were then used to carry out the
reliability analysis.
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The probabilities of small leak, large leak and rupture corresponding to the base case,
Scenario I and II were evaluated by considering and ignoring the generation of new
defects, and are compared in Fig. 3.2. Figure 3.2 indicates, as expected, that considering
the generation of new defects results in higher probabilities of small leak, large leak and
rupture than ignoring the generation of new defects. The new defects have a greater
impact on the probability of small leak than on the probabilities of large leak and rupture.
This is because the probability of small leak is governed by only two variables (i.e. the
pipe wall thickness and defect depth) as shown in the limit state function g1, and is
therefore more sensitive to the uncertainty in the depths of newly generated defects.
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(c) Scenario II (ignoring missing data)
Figure 3.2 Impact of generation of new defects on the system reliability corresponding
to the base case, Scenario I and II
To better compare the failure probabilities associated with the base case and Scenarios
I and II, the probabilities of small leak and burst (i.e. the summation of probabilities of
large leak and rupture) corresponding to the three cases are depicted in Figs. 3.3(a) and
3.3(b), respectively. In each of the two figures, the probabilities of small leak or burst
were evaluated by ignoring and considering the generation of new defects.
Figure 3.3 indicates that the probabilities of burst corresponding to the three scenarios
are practically identical, whereas the probabilities of small leak corresponding to the
three scenarios are marginally different. The fact that different analysis scenarios have a
larger impact on the probabilities of small leak than the probabilities of burst is mainly
attributed to that the probability of small leak is governed by the uncertainties in only two
variables (i.e. wall thickness and defect depth) and therefore more sensitive to the
differences in the defect generation and growth models corresponding to the three
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scenarios. If the generation of new defects is considered, Scenario II leads to the highest
probabilities of small leak for the majority of the forecasting period. This is because that
Scenario II results in on one hand a higher defect generation intensity than Scenario I and
on the other hand slightly higher predicted depths of both existing and new defects than
the base case. If the generation of new defects is ignored, the base case leads to the
lowest probabilities of small leak for the forecasting period. This is because the predicted
depths of existing defects corresponding to the base case are slightly lower than those
predicted by Scenario I and II as observed in Chapter 2.
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(b) Probabilities of burst
Figure 3.3 Comparison of probabilities of small leak and burst corresponding to the
base case, Scenario I and II

3.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter presents a methodology to evaluate the time-dependent system reliability
of corroding pipelines over a given forecasting period starting from the most recent
inspection by simultaneously considering the generation and growth of corrosion defects.
The generation of corrosion defects was modeled by the non-homogenous Poisson
process, whereas the growth of defects was characterized by the non-homogenous gamma
process. The parameters involved in the generation and growth models were evaluated
from the imperfect ILI data through the Bayesian updating, and the corresponding
posterior median values of these model parameters were then used in a simple Monte
Carlo simulation to evaluate the system reliability of corroding pipelines considering
three different failure modes, i.e. small leak, large leak and rupture.
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An example that involves three sets of ILI data for a pipe joint within a natural gas
pipeline located in Alberta was used to illustrate the proposed methodology. The results
of the reliability analysis indicate that ignoring the generation of new defects leads to
underestimations of the probabilities of small leak, large leak and rupture.

The

generation of new defects has the highest impact on the probability of small leak. The
impact on the evaluated system reliability due to three different approaches to deal with
POD associated with the inspection tool in the Bayesian updating of the defect generation
and growth models was also examined. The analysis results suggest that these three
approaches have a marginal impact on the probabilities of small leak, but practically no
impact on the probabilities of burst. The methodology developed in this study could be
implemented in a decision support tool to facilitate the pipeline corrosion management.
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Chapter 4 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future
Study
4.1 Probabilistic Modeling and Bayesian Inference of Metal-loss
Corrosion
To account for the temporally and spatially variable nature of the metal-loss corrosion
on steel oil and gas pipelines, stochastic process-based models are presented in Chapter 2
to characterize the generation and growth of corrosion defects. A Bayesian framework
was established to make inference of the corrosion models based on imperfect in-line
inspection (ILI) data.
The defect generation was characterized by the non-homogenous Poisson process
(NHPP), and the growth of the defect depth was modeled by the non-homogenous
gamma process (NHGP) with a time-dependent shape parameter and a time-independent
scale parameter.

The defect generation and growth models were formulated in a

hierarchical Bayesian framework, which allows the consideration of the probability of
detection (POD) and measurement errors associated with the ILI data in the statistical
inference of the corrosion models.

A simplifying assumption was employed in the

Bayesian formulation; that is, the newly detected defects in the ith inspection are all
generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections. The Bayesian updating of these model
parameters were evaluated using the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation
based on the imperfect ILI data. The data augmentation (DA) technique was employed in
conjunction with the MCMC simulation to deal with the undetected defects (i.e. missing
data) in the Bayesian updating resulting from the imperfect detectability of the ILI tool.
The application of the proposed model was validated using the simulated inspection
data in Example 1 of Chapter 2 and further illustrated using real ILI data in Example 2 of
Chapter 2.

For both examples, three different scenarios were considered, namely

including the missing data in calculating the average POD for each inspection, ignoring
the missing data in calculating the average POD and assuming perfect detectability for all
the inspections (i.e. ignoring POD). Based on the simulated inspection data with the
simplifying assumption involved in the proposed model, the results indicate that the last
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two scenarios lead to underestimated overall defect population, which validates the
proposed Bayesian framework. Based on the more realistic simulated inspection data
(i.e. part of the newly detected defects may be previously undetected defects), the results
indicate that the first scenario leads to overestimation of the overall defect population
because of the simplifying assumption involved in the proposed model. However, the
degree of overestimation is marginal as long as the detectability of the ILI tool is high or
relatively high, which is typically the case for high-resolution ILI tools employed on oil
and gas pipelines nowadays. The overestimation of the defect population due to the
simplifying assumption is somewhat compensated by the overestimation of the average
POD in the second scenario; as a result, the predicted overall defect population agrees the
best with the actual defect population among the three scenarios. In Example 2, it is
observed that the growth paths of the detected defects predicted by the three scenarios
differ only slightly, with the predictions corresponding to the latter two scenarios being
slightly higher than those corresponding to the first scenario.

4.2 Time-dependent System Reliability Analysis of Corroding Pipelines
A simple Monte Carlo simulation-based methodology is described in Chapter 3 to
evaluate the time-dependent system reliability of corroding pipelines containing multiple
active corrosion defects for a given forecasting period starting from the most recent
inspection. This methodology incorporates the corrosion generation and growth models
evaluated from the imperfect ILI data through the Bayesian updating as described in
Chapter 2. The time-dependent system reliability of corroding pipelines is evaluated by
simultaneously considering the generation and growth of corrosion defects in terms of
three distinctive failure modes, namely small leak, large leak and rupture.
The proposed methodology was illustrated using the same pipe joint as described in
Example 2 of Chapter 2. The results of the reliability analysis indicate that ignoring the
generation of new defects in the reliability analysis leads to underestimation of the
system reliability and has the largest impact on the probability of small leak.
Furthermore, the three different approaches to consider POD in the Bayesian updating,
i.e. including the missing data in calculating the average POD, ignoring the missing data
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in calculating the average POD and ignoring POD, somewhat impact the probability of
small leak. Ignoring the missing data in calculating the average POD in the Bayesian
updating of the corrosion growth and generation models generally leads to slightly higher
probabilities of small leak than the other two approaches.

4.3 Recommendations for Future Study
The recommended future studies are described as follows.
First, local covariates such as the type and condition of the coating on the pipe, the
effectiveness of the cathodic protection, and moisture level and corrosivity of the
surrounding soils, if available, can be explicitly taken into account in the corrosion
generation and growth models to improve the predictive capabilities of these models.
Second, the potential spatial correlations between different corrosion defects are worth
investigating. To this end, the application of the random field theory (e.g. Khoshnevisan
2002; Bensi 2010; Bensi et al. 2011) could be explored.
Third, a reliability/risk-based decision support tool can be developed to incorporate
the Bayesian models and reliability analysis methodologies reported in this study to assist
pipeline integrity engineers in developing defensible inspection and maintenance
strategies for corroding pipelines.
Finally, the stochastic process-based Bayesian degradation models can be applied to
other structures and infrastructure systems subjected to localized deteriorations.
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Appendix 2A Derivations of Full Conditional Posterior
Distributions of Model Parameters
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Appendix 2B Procedures for Generating Defect Initiation
Times from a Non-homogenous Poisson Process
It is noted that an NHPP, N(t), with the mean value function

(t > 0)

between the time interval (ti-1, ti] can be transformed to a corresponding HPP, N(z), with
the mean value function m(z) = z between the time interval (0, zi] by letting
, where zi =

. Given that r defects have initiated within the time interval (ti-1,

ti] or equivalently the transformed time interval (0, zi], it follows from the property of the
HPP (Parzen 1999) that the unordered transformed initiation times, z1, z2, ..., zr, are
independent and uniformly distributed within the interval of 0 to zi. This allows the
initiation times, tk (k = 1, 2, ..., r), to be generated from the following two steps:
1) sample zk from a uniform distribution between 0 and zi, and

2) calculate tk =

.
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Appendix 2C Procedures for Simulating Corrosion Data with
the Simplifying Assumption for Defect Generation
The following is the procedure for simulating the corrosion data and corresponding
inspection results assuming that the newly detected defects in the ith inspection are all
generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections.
1) Sample the number of newly generated defects Nig in the ith (i = 1, 2,…, n ) inspection
from the Poisson PMF given by Eq. (2.5).
2) Sample the initial times tsr (r = 1, 2,…, Nig) for the Nig newly generated defects based
on the procedure described in Appendix 2B.
3) Sample the random effect parameters ξr (r = 1, 2,…, Nig) for the Nig defects from the
normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2.
4) Generate the inspected depth of detected defects
4.1) For the ith inspection, set r = 1.
4.2) Generate the depth increment,

, from the gamma distribution given by Eq.

(2.8) with the shape and scale parameters equal to
respectively. Note that

=

and

,

for newly generated defects in the ith inspection

interval.
4.3) If

> xth, accept the defect as a detected defect with a probability of

.

If the defect is accepted as a detected defect, go to Step 4.4); otherwise, set r= r+1
and go to Step 4.2).
4.4) Generate the depth increment associated with the kth inspection (k = i +1, i +2, ...
n) for the accepted defect, Δxkr, from the gamma distribution given by Eq. (2.8) with
the shape and scale parameters equal to
respectively. Calculate
th

the time of the k inspection.

and

,

as the actual depth of the detected defect r at
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4.5) Generate the ILI-reported depth for the detected defect from the ith inspection to
the nth inspection from a multivariate normal distribution fE
4.6) Set r= r+1 and repeat steps 4.2) through 4.5) until r = Nig + 1.
4.7) Repeat Steps 4.1) through 4.6) for all the inspections, i = 1, 2, ..., n.

.
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Appendix 2D Procedures for Simulating Corrosion Data
without the Simplifying Assumption for Defect Generation
The following is the procedure for simulating the corrosion data and corresponding
inspection results without the assumption that the newly detected defects in the ith
inspection are all generated between the (i-1)th and ith inspections, i.e. some of the newly
detected defects in the ith inspection may in fact initiate prior to the (i-1)th inspection but
remain undetected until the ith inspection.
1) Sample the number of newly generated defects Nig in the ith (i = 1, 2,…, n ) inspection
from the Poisson PMF given by Eq. (2.5).
2) Sample the initial times tsr (r = 1, 2,…, Nig) for the Nig newly generated defects based
on the procedure described in Appendix 2B.
3) Sample the random effect parameters ξr (r = 1, 2,…, Nig) for the Nig defects from the
normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2.
4) Generate the inspected depth of detected defects initiated between the (i-1)th and ith
inspection.
4.1) For the ith inspection, set r = 1.
4.2) Generate the depth increment,

, from the gamma distribution given by Eq.

(2.8) with the shape and scale parameters equal to
respectively. Note that

=

and

,

for newly generated defects in the ith inspection

interval.
4.3) Generate the depth increment associated with the kth inspection (k = i +1, i +2, ...
n) for defect r, Δxkr, from the gamma distribution given by Eq. (2.8) with the shape
and scale parameters equal to
respectively. Calculate

and

,

as the actual depth of defect r at the time of

the kth inspection.
4.4) If

> xth, accept the defect as a detected defect with a probability of

.
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If the defect is accepted as a detected defect, go to Step 4.5); otherwise, accept it as an
undetected defect and record its depth

(k = i+1, i+2, ... n). Then set r= r+1 and go

to Step 4.2).
4.5) Generate the ILI-reported depth for the detected defect from the ith inspection to
the nth inspection from a multivariate normal distribution fMVN

.

4.6) Set r= r+1 and repeat steps 4.2) through 4.5) until r = Nig + 1.
5) Generate the inspected depth of detected defects initiated prior to the (i-1)th
inspection.
5.1) If i = 1, go to step 4); otherwise, set r = 1.
5.2) Check the depth,

, for the previously undetected defects. If

defect as a detected defect with a probability of

> xth, accept the

. If the defect is accepted as

a detected defect, go to Step 5.3); otherwise, accept it as an undetected defect and
record its depth

(k = i +1, i +2, ... n). Then set r= r+1 and repeat Step 5.2).

5.3) Generate the ILI-reported depth for the detected defect from the ith inspection to
the nth inspection from a multivariate normal distribution fMVN

.

5.4) Set r= r+1 and repeat steps 5.2) through 5.3) until r = N(i-1)u + 1, where N(i-1)u is
the number of defect initiate prior to the (i-1)th inspection but remain undetected until
the ith inspection.
6) Repeat Steps 4) and 5) for all the inspections, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
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